Selected, processed and translated by Eng. Anelia Dimova, expert in information society policy
Technologies. AI is becoming a commodity, affecting everyone—from countries competing for AI sovereignty to individual citizens. Equally important is the rise of bottom-up AI: in 2026, small to large language models will be able to run on corporate or institutional servers. Open-source development, a major milestone in 2025, is expected to become a central focus of future geostrategic competition.
Geostrategy. Despite all geopolitical pressure, we still have an integrated global internet. However, digital fragmentation is accelerating, with continued fragmentation of filtering social media, other services and the other developments around three major hubs: the United States, China, and potentially the EU. Geoeconomics is becoming a critical dimension of this shift, particularly given the global footprint of major technology companies. And any fragmentation, including trade fragmentation and taxation fragmentation, will inevitably affect them. Equally important is the role of “geo-emotions”: the growing disconnect between public sentiment and industry enthusiasm. While companies remain largely optimistic about AI, public scepticism is increasing, and this divergence may carry significant political implications.
Governance. The core governance dilemma remains whether national representatives—parliamentarians domestically and diplomats internationally—are truly able to protect citizens’ digital interests related to data, knowledge, and cybersecurity. While there are moments of productive discussion and well-run events, substantive progress remains limited. One positive note is that inclusive governance, at least in principle, continues through multistakeholder participation, though it raises its own unresolved questions.
Security. The adoption of the Hanoi Cybercrime Convention at the end of the year is a positive development, and substantive discussions at the UN continue despite ongoing criticism of the institution. While it remains unclear whether these processes are making us more secure, they are expanding the governance toolbox. At the same time, attention should extend beyond traditional concerns—such as cyberwarfare, terrorism, and crime—to emerging risks associated with the interconnectivity to AI systems through APIs. These points of integration create new interdependencies and potential backdoors for cyberattacks.
Human rights. Human rights are increasingly under strain, with recent policy shifts by technology companies and growing transatlantic tensions between the EU and the United States highlighting a changing landscape. While debates continue to focus heavily on bias and ethics, deeper human rights concerns—such as the rights to knowledge, education, dignity, meaningful work, and the freedom to remain human rather than optimised—receive far less attention. As AI reshapes society, the human rights community must urgently revisit its priorities, grounding them in the protection of life, dignity, and human potential.
Economy. The traditional three-pillar framework comprising security, development, and human rights is shifting toward economic and security concerns, with human rights being increasingly sidelined. Technological and economic issues, from access to rare earths to AI models, are now treated as strategic security matters. This trend is expected to accelerate in 2026, making the digital economy a central component of national security. Greater attention should be paid to taxation, the stability of the global trade system, and how potential fragmentation or disruption of global trade could impact the tech sector.
Standards. The lesson from social media is clear: without interoperable standards, users get locked into single platforms. The same risk exists for AI. To avoid repeating these mistakes, developing interoperable AI standards is critical. Ideally, individuals and companies should build their own AI, but where that isn’t feasible, at a minimum, platforms should be interoperable, allowing seamless movement across providers such as OpenAI, Cloudy, or DeepSeek. This approach can foster innovation, competition, and user choice in the emerging AI-dominated ecosystem.
Content. The key issue for content in 2026 is the tension between governments and US tech, particularly regarding compliance with EU laws. At the core, countries have the right to set rules for content within their territories, reflecting their interests, and citizens expect their governments to enforce them. While media debates often focus on misuse or censorship, the fundamental question remains: can a country regulate content on its own soil? The answer is yes, and adapting to these rules will be a major source of tension going forward.
Development. Countries that are currently behind in AI aren’t necessarily losing. Success in AI is less about owning large models or investing heavily in hardware, and more about preserving and cultivating local knowledge. Small countries should invest in education, skills, and open-source platforms to retain and grow knowledge locally. Paradoxically, a slower entry into AI could be an advantage, allowing countries to focus on what truly matters: people, skills, and effective governance.
Environment. Concerns about AI’s impact on the environment and water resources persist. It is worth asking whether massive AI farms are truly necessary. Small AI systems could serve as extensions of these processes or as support for training and education, reducing the need for energy- and water-intensive platforms. At a minimum, AI development should prioritise sustainability and efficiency, mitigating the risk of large-scale digital waste while still enabling practical benefits.